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Abstract
This paper proposes a careful separation between an entity’s epistemic
system and their decision system. Crucially, Bayesian counterfactuals are
estimated by the epistemic system; not by the decision system. Based on
this remark, I prove the existence of Newcomb-like problems for which an
epistemic system necessarily expects the entity to make a counterfactually
bad decision.
I then address (a slight generalization of) Newcomb’s paradox. I solve
the specific case where the player believes that the predictor applies Bayes
rule with a supset of all the data available to the player. I prove that the
counterfactual optimality of the 1-box strategy depends on the player’s
prior on the predictor’s additional data. If these additional data are not
expected to reduce sufficiently the predictor’s uncertainty on the player’s
decision, then the player’s epistemic system will counterfactually prefer
to 2-box. But if the predictor’s data is believed to make them quasi-
omniscient, then 1-box will be counterfactually prefered. Implications of
the analysis are then discussed.
More generally, I argue that, to better understand or design an entity,
it is useful to clearly separate the entity’s epistemic, decision, but also
data collection, reward and maintenance systems, whether the entity is
human, algorithmic or institutional.
1 Introduction
Newcomb’s paradox is an iconic paradox of decision theory. Introduced by
Nozick [1969], the problem involves a player, call her Alice, and a predictor
that we will name Omega. Omega predicts Alice’s behavior, and, essentially,
determines her reward based on this prediction. This will then put Alice into
some seemingly impossible dilemma.
On one hand, a seemingly causal argument suggests thatAlice should ignore
her predictability, especially once Omega’s prediction has already been made.
This argument suggests that Alice should then adopt a strategy called 2-box.
On the other hand, by modifying her behavior, and assuming that Omega’s
prediction is really reliable, Alice seems able to bias Omega’s prediction so
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that it becomes aligned with Alice’s interest. This suggests that Alice may
be able to hack her predictability to gain more rewards — a strategy known as
1-box. More thorough details are provided in Section 3.1.
Remarkably, scholars are extremely divided on what strategy Alice should
adopt. In fact, Newcomb’s paradox seems to be unveiling a fundamental gap
in our understanding of decision theory, and thus of related topics such as free
will, game theory and algorithm design. Because of this, over the last half a
century, Newcomb’s paradox has received a lot of attention from philosophers
(Schlesinger [1974], Locke [1978], Horwich [1985], Nozick [1994, 1997], to name a
few), mathematicians (Gardner [1974], Wijayatunga [2019], Giacopelli [2019]),
economists (Broome [1989], Sugden [1991], Weber [2016]), political scientists
(Brams [1975], Frydman et al. [1982]), computer scientists (Aaronson [2013],
Everitt [2018]) and psychologists (Bar-Hillel and Margalit [1972]).
In addition to connections to fundamental philosophical problems, New-
comb’s paradox has been linked to practical problems, such as the voting dilemma
(see Elster [1987]). Assuming that Alice’s vote has a negligible effect, but is
time-costly for her, intuitively, the equivalent of 2-box would be to argue that
Alice’s optimal selfish strategy is to not take the time to vote. However, it has
been argued that, by going voting, Alice changes what Alice would predict
about the behaviour of individuals similar to her, thereby significantly increas-
ing the probability that Alice’s favorite candidate will get elected — which is
in Alice’s selfish interest. A 1-box argument suggests that Alice should vote.
In this paper, we present a novel analysis of Newcomb’s paradox. The core
idea of the analysis is a clear separation between an individual’s epistemic sys-
tem, and their decision system. The epistemic system will be assumed to be
purely Bayesian, which means that all of its thoughts result from data and the
laws of probability. In particular, thereby, the epistemic system can engage in
counterfactual reasoning, to determine what decisions yield the largest counter-
factual expected rewards.
As any good Bayesian, at any point in time, the epistemic system must also
assign a probability to any future event. This evidently includes the individual’s
future decision. Now, in principle, such a probability could take the values
0 or 1. However, we stress the fact that an epistemic system with such a
perfect knowledge of the individual’s decision cannot engage in a counterfactual
reasoning. Under perfect knowledge, and under the laws of probability, Bayesian
counterfactual reasoning becomes nonsensical.
As a result, most of this paper discusses the arguably more realistic case
of imperfect knowledge of the decision system. This means that the epistemic
system fails to know with full certainty the algorithm executed by the decision
system, and the decision system’s inputs. In such a case, in Section 2, we prove
Theorem 1, which says that no decision system can be expected to guarantee
counterfactual optimization. We then discuss consequences of the theorem for
decision theory.
In Section 3, we then tackle a generalization of Newcomb’s paradox, under
the assumption that a Bayesian Omega has collected a supset of Alice’s data.
We show that the counterfactual optimality of a decision strongly depends on
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the extent to which Alice believes the predictor Omega to know more than
her about her decision system. Indeed, if Alice does not believe that Omega
knows more than her, then 2-box is the only counterfactually optimal decision.
But if Alice expects Omega to know a lot more to the point of being quasi-
omniscient, then 1-box becomes the only counterfactually optimal decision.
These findings are formalized by Theorem 2, and by its diverse corollaries (see
Section 3.3).
Section 4 will then discuss our results, and raise further questions. First,
we analyze the impact of relaxing the assumptions of the previous section. Sec-
ond, we discuss implications of our analysis to practical Newcomb-like problems.
Third, we generalize the main idea of the paper, namely the separation of epis-
temic and decision systems, to a further separation of different systems of any
information processing entity.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Counterfactual optimization is impossible
In this section, we show that no entity can guarantee counterfactual optimiza-
tion. To understand this claim, we first insist on the distinction between an
entity’s epistemic system and their decision system. We then stress the fact that
counterfactual optimization is not an algorithm, but a property, which results
from the interaction between the epistemic system, the decision system and the
problem at hand. We then state and prove the impossibility of counterfactual
optimization, and discuss consequences.
2.1 Epistemic versus decision systems
In this paper, we study how an information processing entity, like a human, a
machine or an organization, infers a world view and makes a decision. Confus-
ingly, these two different tasks seem entangled. On one hand, it seems impor-
tant to first infer a world view before making a decision. But as highlighted by
Newcomb-like paradoxes, it seems that a decision can sometimes inform a world
view.
To disentangle views and decisions, we propose to clarify the distinction
between these two tasks. In fact, we will assume that each task is handled by
a specific system of the entity. More specifically, in this paper, we focus on
an entity that we call Alice, which possesses both an epistemic and a decision
system. We call them respectively Emma andDan. Emma will infer the state
of the world based on her data. Dan will compute decisions based on his data.
2.1.1 Bayesianism
Except in Section 4.2.2, we assume Emma to be a pure Bayesian. In other
words, Emma will apply solely the laws of probabilities to compute credences
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and expectations1. In particular, Emma’s credence in a theory T of the state
of the world, given the data DE she collected, will be given by Bayes rule:
P [T |DE] =
P [DE |T ]P [T ]
P [DE]
. (1)
Note that we adopt here the purely Bayesian interpretation of probabilities.
Namely, as discussed by Laplace [1840], such probabilities describe an entity’s
knowledge and uncertainty, and apply even in a deterministic universe.
In this paper, we will discuss only Emma and Omega’s credences, mostly
under the assumption that they have common priors, and that Emma’s data
DE are common knowledge. As a result, without loss of generality, we omit the
conditioning by DE in our notations.
2.1.2 Counterfactuals
In our paper, we analyze Dan’s decision through the lenses of purely Bayesian
counterfactuals.
Definition 1. Emma counterfactually prefers a decision X if, for any alter-
native decision Y, Emma estimates the counterfactual expected rewards to be
larger assuming X than assuming Y, i.e.
E [R|X] ≥ E [R|Y] . (2)
Recall that the expectations are implicitly also conditioned by Emma’s data DE.
Counterfactual optimality is often invoked to argue in favor of one decision
over the other. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, some
observers have argued that lockdown was not actually as bad for the economy
as one might expect. Their argument was not that the economy did not suffer
during the lockdown; rather, they argued that the counterfactual world without
a lockdown decision would have seen a similar blow to the economy. By then also
taking public health into consideration, such observers argued that lockdown
was very probably counterfactually optimal. In other words, these observers
have essentially argued that
E [Welfare |Lockdown] ≥ E [Welfare |No-Lockdown] , (3)
where Welfare refers to some sort of public good, which involves both public
health and financial safety. Interestingly, some opponents agreed with the gen-
eral approach to determine if Lockdown was a good decision, but disagreed
with the estimation of the counterfactual expectations2.
1This contrasts with some versions of causal decision theory that invoke
Pearl and Mackenzie [2018]’s “do-operator”. This operator is thus added to Bayesian-
ism, and also depends on some causal modeling of the problem. As a result, we do not
consider it to be purely Bayesian.
2Note that the counterfactual expectations should be also all conditioned on all the avail-
able data at the moment of the decision lockdown, including the dangerous spread of the
COVID-19 disease.
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Counterfactual optimization is also often invoked in the analysis of New-
comb’s paradox, which is presented in Section 3.1. Again, the disagreements
often lie in the estimation of the counterfactual expectations. The 1-boxer will
typically argue that E [R| 1-box] = R, where R is the content of the opaque
box if the predictor Omega predicts 1-box, while the counterfactual expected
rewards are E [R| 2-box] = r < R, since Omega would then leave the opaque
box empty. However, the 2-box will argue that E [R| 2-box] = r+E [R| 1-box].
Clearly, both cannot be right simultaneously. Section 3 will aim to clarify what
is going on.
2.1.3 Imperfect knowledge
One feature of Bayesianism is that, if P [D] = 0, then P [T |D] is ill-defined. In
a sense, a Bayesian cannot consider events that they have completely discarded.
But this raises a serious technical issue, if we assume that Emma knows for
sure Dan’s decisionX. Indeed, Emma would then be completely discarding the
possibility that Dan makes an alternative decision Y. In other words, Emma
may believe P [Y] = 0. But then, the counterfactual expectation E [R|Y] would
be ill-defined, which makes counterfactual optimization nonsensical. To resolve
this issue, in this paper, we will only consider Bayesians with imperfect knowl-
edge.
Definition 2. A Bayesian has imperfect knowledge about X if, for any possible
value x of the event, the Bayesian assigns a strictly positive probability to X = x.
In the case of Alice, it seems actually reasonable to assume that, especially
in practice, Emma cannot guarantee that Dan will execute a given decision
algorithm. After all, even if Emma carefully inspected Dan before Dan makes
a decision, and even if Emma knows exactly the data given to Dan, Dan
may still slightly change before the computation is executed. In other words,
Emma may precisely know what Dan was like seconds ago, but she cannot
know for sure what Dan will be doing in a few seconds, when Dan actually
runs his computation to deliver a decision. It thus seems reasonable to assume
that Emma has an imperfect knowledge of Dan’s decision.
2.2 Formal impossibility
Finally, we can state the main result of this section. It asserts that no entity
can guarantee counterfactual optimization.
Theorem 1. There exists a decision problem with n options, for which any
entity with imperfect knowledge assigns a probability at least 1− 1/n to counter-
factually bad decisions.
Proof. Consider n opaque boxes. Dan must choose one of the boxes. Denote
Box-i the fact that Dan chooses the i-th box.
But, now assume that Emma gets convinced that a predictor Omega has
the same data as her and knows her prior. As a result, Emma believes with
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probability 1 that Omega can compute Emma’s credence P [Box-i] in Dan
deciding Box-i. Suppose also that Emma also believes with probability 1 that
Omega decides the content of box i as follows. Omega computes the smallest
value ∗ of i such that P [Box-i] ≤ 1/n. Omega then sets R∗ = 1, and Rj = 0
for j 6= ∗.
Then, from Emma’s perspective, given that she knows the rewards Ri’s,
any decision Box-j different from Box-∗ is counterfactually bad. However, we
also know that Emma also assigns a probability at most 1/n to Box-∗. Thus,
according to Emma, there is a probability at least 1− 1/n that Dan’s decision
is counterfactually bad.
Note that our proof assumes that Emma knows for sure that Omega knows
Emma’s data and prior. Interestingly, it is however robust to relaxing this
condition, and to assuming that Emma only strongly believes that Omega
knows her data and prior. This then yields a probability of at least 1−1/n−o(1)
of a counterfactually bad decision, where o(1) denotes a term arbitrarily small
by considering that Emma’s credences are arbitrarily close to 1.
2.2.1 Why AIXI escapes our impossibility theorem
It is noteworthy that Theorem 1 does not apply to the framework of AIXI, a
counterfactually optimal decision algorithm introduced by Hutter [2001, 2004].
In this framework, an entity called AIXI interacts with its environment by
making decisions based on its observed past data, and the environment responds
to AIXI’s decision by providing new data and a reward3.
Essentially, AIXI escapes our impossibility theorem because the AIXI
framework prevents external entities from making AIXI’s reward depend on
AIXI’s uncertainty about its decision. More precisely, AIXI’s expected re-
wards given AIXI’s decision X are assumed to be independent from AIXI’s
uncertainty about deciding X. Formally, this assumption enforces the equality4
E [R |X ∧ P [X ] = p] = E [R |X ∧ P [X ] = q] for any values of p and q. As a re-
sult, AIXI’s credence P [X] in the fact that it will decide X cannot be exploited
by the environment to bias AIXI’s rewards. This contrasts with our proof of
Theorem 1 in which, if P [X] is large, then the reward givenX would be designed
to be small.
Unfortunately, the restricted framework of AIXI has been argued to make
AIXI unrealistic. In particular, the fact that the environment cannot exploit
its understanding of AIXI seems incompatible with embedded agency, as dis-
cussed by Demski and Garrabrant [2019]. Embedded agency assumes that any
3The environment is assumed to reply according to a computable probability distribution
that depends on past data and decisions, and the latest decision.
4This is formalized by an environment µ whose outputs given the past and AIXI’s decision
cannot depend on the policy pi of AIXI. This allows AIXI’s counterfactual rewards to be a
linear function of pi, where pi is regarded as a probability distribution. Conversely, our proof
of Theorem 1 designed a problem where the rewards given a decision X highly depend on pi.
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entity must be part of its environment5. Given embedded agency, it then seems
that any entity can be analyzed by some other entity Omega of the environ-
ment. Omega can then exploit its analysis to make counterfactual optimization
impossible, as proved by Theorem 1.
2.2.2 A gap in decision theory
Perhaps the most important take-away of Theorem 1 is that counterfactual
optimization cannot be a decision algorithm. Rather, it should be regarded as a
property that no decision algorithm always satisfy. At best, a decision algorithm
should be designed to often satisfy counterfactual optimization. However, the
more general question of what ought to be expected from a “good” decision
algorithm seems still far from being resolved.
Theorem 1 may share similarities with the no-free-lunch theorems in learning
theory (Wolpert [1996], Joyce and Herrmann [2018]). These theorems suggest
that there is no canonical property that identifies the “good” learning algo-
rithms, which are arguably what a “good” epistemic system should implement.
Instead, the defense of Bayesianism, like in Hoang [2020], rests upon a myriad
a desirable properties, some of which can be proved to be unique to Bayesian-
ism, such as robustness to Dutch book arguments (Teller [1973], Skyrms [1987]),
compatibility with logic (Cox [1946, 1963], Jaynes [2003]) and statistical admis-
sibility (Wald [1947], Robert [2007]).
In fact, just as Bayesianism actually includes a large family of epistemologies,
each derived from a given prior, the right path forward in decision theory might
consist of proving that some desirable property can only be satisfied by decision
algorithms taken from a certain family. Unfortunately, this research direction
is out of the scope of the present paper.
3 Newcomb’s paradox
In this section, we analyze Newcomb’s paradox under the lens of Bayesian coun-
terfactuals. But first, we need to consider a slight generalization of Newcomb’s
paradox, which more adequately fits the Bayesian framework.
3.1 A slight generalization of Newcomb’s problem
In this paper, we consider a slight variation on Newcomb’s problem to make
it more realistic. In particular, we will care about the data that enables the
predictor to make its prediction. Let us describe the problem we consider.
Alice enters a room with two boxes A and B.
5Embedded agency raises numerous other challenges, such as the uncomputability of Bayes
rule proved by Solomonoff [2009], or its computational hardness (see Aaronson [2012]), as well
as the risk of wireheading the reward system (see Everitt [2018]). On the positive side, it
allows improvement by a maintenance system, as discussed in Section 4.3.3.
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• Box A is opaque. Alice cannot see what is inside. But she knows how
the content of Box A was decided, which is discussed below.
• Box B is transparent. Alice sees that Box B contains a reward r > 0.
Alice is then told that she must decide between two strategies.
• The 1-box strategy consists of only taking Box A.
• The 2-box strategy consists of taking both Box A and Box B.
What makes Newcomb’s paradox interesting is the way the content of Box A
is decided. In some classical versions of Newcomb’s paradox, some omniscient
entity Omega makes a prediction. If Omega predicts that Alice will 1-box,
then Omega puts a large reward6 R in Box A. Otherwise, if Omega predicts
that Alice will 2-box, then Omega leaves Box A empty.
However, the omniscience assumption is reasonably criticized for being too
unrealistic. In this paper, we will instead assume that Omega is an information
processing system which exploits huge amounts of data about Alice and about
the world. Based on this large database DΩ, Omega infers a probability ω ,
P [1-box |DΩ] that Alice will 1-box. Now, given this probability guess ω,
Omega will throw a biased coin, which has a probability ω to land on heads. If
the coin lands on heads, Omega will put the reward R in Box A. Otherwise,
Omega leaves Box A empty.
Note that the classical version of Newcomb’s paradox is retrieved by as-
suming that Omega knows Alice’s decision process and all the inputs to this
process. Indeed, Omega can then simply simulate this decision process to de-
termine Alice’s decision. Our variant is thus a natural generalization of the
classical paradox.
Now, Alice knows how Omega operates. She knows that Omega applies
Bayes rule and she knows thatOmega has processed a huge amount of data that
Alice cannot access. Alice wants to maximize her expected (counterfactual)
rewards. Alice now has to choose between the 1-box and the 2-box strategy.
What should she do?
3.1.1 Can Omega really know more?
The odd feature of Newcomb’s paradox is the assumption that some external
observer Omega can better know Alice than she knows herself. At first sight
at least, it may seem that no one can better guess what Alice will decide than
Alice herself, right before she makes her decision.
However, Libet [1993]’s famous experiment suggests that this may not be
the case. An algorithm processing some magnetic resonance imaging of Alice’s
brain may then be better able to predict some of Alice’s decision — at least
a fraction of a second before the decision is made. More generally, it seems in
6To fix ideas, you can imagine r = $1, 000 and R = $1, 000, 000, though our analysis will
hold for any other values of the rewards r and R.
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fact clear that humans’ decision systems are largely unknown to them. Simi-
larly, and perhaps more strikingly, large institutions often hire external auditing
companies to better understand how their decisions are made. Likewise, under-
standing in details what decisions were made by the YouTube recommender
systems, and how they were made, is arguably largely out of reach of any data
analytics systems within YouTube.
Perhaps a more realistic way for Omega to predict Alice’s decision is to
collect large amounts of data, not only about Alice, but also about entities
similar to Alice. Typically, a philosopher who posed Newcomb’s paradox to
generations of students might have gained a remarkable capability to predict
their current students’ intuitions for the Newcomb’s paradox. Similarly, by
analyzing all sorts of data available on social medias, an algorithm could detect
patterns that would allow it to reliably predict what a given social media user
may decide. In fact, Wang and Kosinski [2018] designed one such algorithm,
then replicated by Leuner [2019], that achieved superhuman performances at
predicting sexual orientations from human faces.
3.2 The main result
Let us focus on the case where Emma believes that Omega has the same prior
as her, and has a supset of her data. We denote p , P [1-box] Emma’s prior
on 1-box, and σ2 , V [ω] her prior variance on Omega’s prediction. Assuming
that Emma has imperfect knowledge of Dan then corresponds to 0 < p < 1.
Remarkably, under our assumptions, we can determine Emma’s counterfactual
preferences based solely on the variables p and σ2.
Theorem 2. Assume that Emma has imperfect knowledge of Dan. Suppose
also that Emma believes that Omega is Bayesian, has the same prior as her
and knows a supset of her data. Then, Emma counterfactually prefers to 1-
box, if and only if, we have
r
R
≤
σ2
p(1− p)
.
Unsurprisingly, the larger R is relatively to r, the more 1-box will tend
to be preferable. But perhaps what’s more interesting is the right-hand side.
Note that the quantity p(1−p) is essentially the variance according to Emma’s
prior on what Dan will do. Thus, the right-hand side compares the variance
of Omega’s prediction to the variance of Dan’s decision. Or, put differently,
it is a measure of how much Emma expects Omega to know more than her
about Dan. Intuitively, the more Emma knows about Dan, the more she will
counterfactually prefer to 2-box. But the more she feels that Omega knows
more than her, the more she will counterfactually prefer to 1-box.
Thus, at its core, Newcomb’s paradox really seems to be about how much
an entity believes that an observer can better know them than they know them-
selves. This may seem extremely confusing at first glance. But separating our
epistemic system from our decision system arguably helps to clarify the origin
of the paradox. Indeed, Newcomb’s paradox is actually rather about how much
the observer can better predict the output of the entity’s decision system, than
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what the entity’s epistemic system can predict. In particular, if this epistemic
system is unreliable, then it may not be that hard to outperform it.
3.2.1 Argument of authority
Before proving Theorem 2, let us first note the following lemma, which will be
critical in the analysis of Newcomb’s problem. The lemma states the validity
of the argument of authority, if the authority is more a knowledgeable honest
Bayesian.
Lemma 1 (Argument of authority). If Emma believes that Omega is an hon-
est Bayesian, that Omega has the same prior as her, and that Omega has a
supset of her data, then Emma should believe whatever Omega says. More
formally, we have
P [T |P [T |DΩ] = p] = p. (4)
Proof. To clarify, denote Dp the set of data DΩ such that P [T |DΩ] = p. Then
Dp excludes all data which do not satisfy this. By the law of total probability,
we see that P [T |Dp] is then necessarily an average of terms P [T |DΩ], for
DΩ ∈ Dp. But all such terms equal p, hence the theorem.
3.2.2 Useful lemmas
The proof of Theorem 2 yields some insights into the mechanisms at play. In
fact, it rests on the following four interesting observations, on what Emma
predicts based on her uncertainty about Omega’s prediction. All the lemmas
implicitly make the same assumptions as Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. Emma’s prior p on Dan deciding to 1-box is equal to the expec-
tation of her prior on Omega’s prediction, i.e. p = E [ω].
Proof. According to the law of total probability, P [1-box] = Eω [P [1-box |ω]].
By Lemma 1, if Emma learned Omega’s prediction ω = P [1-box |DΩ], then
she too would assign a probability ω to Dan deciding to 1-box. Therefore,
P [1-box |ω] = ω. Thus, p = P [1-box] = E [ω].
Lemma 3. Emma assigns a prior probability p to Box A containing the large
reward R, P [A = R] = p.
Proof. According to the law of total probability, P [A = R] = Eω [P [A = R |ω]].
By the decision algorithm of Omega (see Section 3.1), we have P [A = R |ω] =
ω. Thus P [A = R] = E [ω] = p.
Lemma 4. Emma’s posterior belief that Box A contains the large reward
R, given a 1-box decision by Dan, is given by P [A = R | 1-box] = p +
σ2
p
.
Interestingly, this quantity is larger than the prior probability, especially if the
variance σ2 on Omega’s prediction is large and if Omega is expected to essen-
tially predict 2-box..
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Proof. By the law of total probabilities, we have
P [A = R | 1-box] =
∑
ω
P [A = R | 1-box ∧ ω]P [ω | 1-box] (5)
=
∑
ω
P [A = R ∧ 1-box |ω]
P [1-box |ω]
P [1-box |ω]P [ω]
P [1-box]
(6)
=
∑
ω
P [A = R |ω]P [1-box |ω]
P [ω]
p
(7)
=
1
p
∑
ω
ω2P [ω] =
E
[
ω2
]
p
=
p2 + σ2
p
= p+
σ2
p
. (8)
In the second line, we used Bayes rule. In the third line, we use the conditionally
independence of events A = R and 1-box, given ω, as well as Lemma 2. In the
fourth line, we exploited the way the decision of A = R is decided by ω, as well
as the Lemma 1 which implies P [1-box |ω] = ω. The last line also uses the
definition of σ2.
Lemma 5. Emma’s posterior belief that Box A contains the large reward R,
given a 2-box decision by Dan, is given by P [A = R | 2-box] = p −
σ2
(1− p)
.
Perhaps not surprisingly given Lemma 4, this posterior is smaller than the prior,
especially for large values of σ2 and when Omega is expected to essentially
predict 1-box.
Proof. Recall that, by Lemmas 2 and 3, we have P [A = R] = p = P [2-box].
Now, Bayes rule yields
P [A = R | 2-box] =
P [2-box |A = R]P [A = R]
P [2-box]
(9)
=
(1− P [1-box |A = R]) p
1− P [1-box]
(10)
=
(
1−
P [A = R | 1-box]P [1-box]
P [A = R]
)
p
1− p
(11)
=
(
1− p−
σ2
p
)
p
1− p
= 1−
σ2
1− p
, (12)
where, in the fourth line, we used Lemma 4.
3.2.3 Proof of the main theorem
Theorem 2 then follows from our four previous lemmas.
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Proof of Theorem 2. From Lemmas 4 and 5, we have
E [A | 1-box] = R · P [A = R | 1-box] =
(
p+
σ2
p
)
R¯, and (13)
E [A+B | 2-box] = R
(
p−
σ2
1− p
)
+ r. (14)
Now, Emma counterfactually prefers to 1-box if and only if the former con-
ditional expectation is larger than the second, which is equivalent to saying
σ2
p
≥
r
R
−
σ2
1− p
. Rearranging the terms yields the theorem.
3.3 Corollaries
In this section, we discuss the corollaries of Theorem 2. These corollaries yield
greater insight into the key variables of Newcomb’s paradox.
3.3.1 If Emma thinks she knows as much
Corollary 1. For any rewards R > r, if Emma has imperfect knowledge of
Dan and if she expects Omega to have the same prior and data as her, then
she will counterfactually prefer to 2-box.
Proof. This is the special case where σ2 = 0.
In particular, if Emma is almost sure than Omega has the same prior and
data as her, and if she is almost sure that Dan will 2-box, then she is almost
sure that Dan’s decision is counterfactually optimal.
3.3.2 The more Omega knows, the better 1-box looks
In this section, we show that σ2 is an increasing function of the size of the data
DΩ that Emma suspects Omega to have. In other words, the more Emma
thinks that Omega has a more data than her, the more she will lean towards
counterfactually preferring to 1-box.
Lemma 6. Denote ω(D) = P [1-box |D] the prediction made based on data D
about Dan. If we know with that the data D+Ω contain data DΩ, even though
both are unknown, then
V
[
ω(D+Ω )
]
= V [ω(DΩ)] + EDΩ
[
V
[
ω(D+Ω)
∣∣DΩ]] . (15)
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Proof. Note that
V
[
ω(D+Ω)
]
= E
[
ω(D+Ω)
2
]
− p2 = EDΩ
[
ED+
Ω
[
ω(D+Ω)
2
∣∣DΩ]
]
− p2 (16)
= EDΩ
[
ED+
Ω
[
ω(D+Ω)
2
∣∣DΩ]− ω(DΩ)2 + ω(DΩ)2
]
− p2 (17)
= EDΩ
[
ED+
Ω
[
ω(D+Ω)
2
∣∣DΩ]− ED+
Ω
[
ω(D+Ω )
∣∣DΩ]2
]
+ E
[
ω(DΩ)
2
]
− E [ω(DΩ)]
2
(18)
= EDΩ
[
V
[
ω(D+Ω)
∣∣DΩ]]+ V [ω(DΩ)] , (19)
where, in the third line, we used the fact that, if D+Ω containsDΩ, then ω(DΩ) =
E
[
ω(D+Ω)
∣∣DΩ].
As a corollary, we have V
[
ω(D+Ω)
]
≥ V [ω(DΩ)]. This means that, for a
Newcomb paradox withOmega+ that has more data thanOmega, the variance
σ2 of the predictor’s prediction is larger. In particular, as Omega collects more
and more data, Emma will tend more and more towards 1-box.
3.3.3 If Box B contains more rewards (r ≥ R)
Unsurprisingly, if the reward r of Box B is necessarily larger than the reward
of Box A, then 2-box is counterfactually preferable.
Corollary 2. If r ≥ R, if Emma has imperfect knowledge of Dan, and if she
expects Omega to have the same prior and more data, then Emma counter-
factually prefers to 2-box.
Proof of Corollary 2. Lemma 6 with D+Ω = DΩ ∧1-box implies that p(1− p) ≥
σ2. If r ≥ R, then we have
r
R
≥ 1 ≥
σ2
p(1− p)
.
3.3.4 Quasi-omniscient Omega
One particularly interesting particular case is that of a quasi-omniscientOmega,
which knows a lot more about Dan than Emma does. We formalize quasi-
omniscience as follows.
Definition 3. Emma believes Omega to be quasi-omniscient about Dan, if
Emma rules out an uncertain prediction by Omega. Formally, Omega is
δ-omniscient if P [ω ∈ (δ, 1− δ)] = 0.
Note that δ-omniscience is a property that depends on Emma’s prior on the
data DΩ that Omega has access to. In fact, it is arguably not a fundamental
property of Omega itself.
One thing that makes this case interesting is that, for a fixed prior p, es-
pecially in the limit δ → 0, the variance σ2 gets maximized. In particular,
throughout this section, we assume 0 < δ < min{p, 1 − p}, which allows to
guarantee the fact that the conditional expectations that we will consider are
well-defined.
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Lemma 7. If Emma believes that Omega knows more and is δ-omniscient,
then σ2 ≥ p(1− p)− 3δ − o(δ).
Proof. First, recall that, by Lemma 2, E [ω] = p. Now, denote q , P [ω ≥ 1− δ].
By the law of total probability,
p = E [ω |ω ≤ δ] (1 − q) + E [ω |ω ≥ 1− δ] q ≤ δ + q, (20)
and thus q ≥ p− δ. Therefore, σ2 = E
[
ω2
]
− p2. Now, note that
E
[
ω2
]
= E
[
ω2
∣∣ω ≤ δ]P [ω ≤ δ] + E [ω2 ∣∣ω ≥ 1− δ]P [ω ≥ 1− δ] (21)
≥ 0 + (1− δ)2q ≥ (1 − δ)2(p− δ) ≥ p− (1 + 2p)δ − o(δ). (22)
Therefore, we have σ2 ≥ p(1− p)− 3δ − o(δ).
We can then state the following insightful corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 3. If Emma has imperfect information about Dan, if she believes
Omega knows more than her, and if she believes Omega to be δ-omniscient,
then, in the limit δ ≪ min{p, 1− p}, Emma counterfactually prefers to 1-box.
Proof. Algebraic manipulations show that σ
2
p(1−p) = 1−
3δ
p(1−p) −o
(
δ
p(1−p)
)
. We
conclude by applying Theorem 2.
In other words, for any given values of R > r, and for any given prior un-
certainty from Emma about Dan’s decision, there is a sufficiently omniscient
Omega such that Emma will counterfactually prefer to 1-box. Or, put differ-
ently, if Alice is pretty sure that she will 1-box, and if she is pretty sure that
Omega is pretty-pretty-pretty sure of what Alice decide, then Alice will be
pretty sure to make a counterfactually optimal decision.
This conclusion may clarify some of the disagreements about Newcomb’s
paradox. If one believes that Alice fully knows what she decides, then it seems
meaningless to consider that Omega could know a lot better than Alice what
she will decide. Similarly, by considering that Omega is fully omniscient, one
may be tempted to exclude some scenarios, such as Omega being wrong. But
such scenarios are arguably not quite Bayesian, nor realistic. By more carefully
considering imperfect knowledge, purely Bayesian counterfactuals in Newcomb-
like problems arguably seem less mysterious.
4 Discussion
While our theorems closed a few problems, they arguably raised even more
questions. In this section, we discuss take-aways and future research directions.
4.1 What if Omega does not know more?
The results of Section 3 assumed that Emma believes that Omega has the
same prior as her, as well as a supset of her data. In this section, we discuss the
challenges to remove this assumption.
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4.1.1 If Emma knows more
If Emma has a supset of Omega’s data, then she would know Omega’s pre-
diction ω. It can be shown that, as a result, if Emma has imperfect knowledge
of Dan, then so does Omega. But this also implies that Omega’s actual de-
cision to put R in Box A is not fully known to Omega. It may thus also be
imperfectly known to Emma.
Unfortunately, this last bit of uncertainty may be where a Newcomb-like
paradox kicks in. Typically, Omega’s coin toss might be further biased by
another entity Omega+ that does have more data than Emma7.
Note though that if Emma believes that the coin toss is independent from
Dan’s decision given Emma’s data, then Emma can be proved to counter-
factually prefer to 2-box. Similarly, if Omega’s uncertainty on the content of
Box A disappears, for instance if Omega now decides to put R in Box A if
and only if its credence in 1-box satisfies P [1-box |DΩ] ≥ 1/2, then Emma
will also counterfactually prefer to 2-box.
4.1.2 No one has more data
The most general and realistic case is evidently when Emma and Omega have
access to very different data. In such a case, Lemma 1 does not apply. Unfor-
tunately, as a result, Emma’s counterfactual preferences are then much harder
to analyze.
Nevertheless, it seems that the global take-away of our analysis still applies.
Essentially, the more data Emma has compared to Omega, the more 2-box
probably seems counterfactually preferable to her. Conversely, the more data
Omega has, the more it seems that Emma will counterfactually prefer to 1-
box. However, we leave open the problem of proving this mathematically.
4.1.3 Diverging priors
The other important assumption we have made throughout our analysis is that
Emma believes that Omega has the same Bayesian prior as her. One way
to weaken this assumption is to suppose instead that Emma has a prior on
Omega’s possible priors. By expliciting the prior on priors, it is then only a
computation for Emma to determine what decision is counterfactually prefer-
able.
Again, it seems intuitive that, as Omega gathers more and more data,
Emma will tend to counterfactually prefer to 1-box. We conjecture that, even
in this case, if Emma assigns a strictly positive probability to Omega’s actual
prior, and if she believes Omega to be sufficiently quasi-omniscient, then she
will counterfactually prefer to 1-box. This has yet to be proved though.
7Recall that the probabilities we consider here are Bayesian. They describe an entity’s
ignorance. Therefore, they are not assumed to describe some fundamental randomness within
the laws of physics.
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4.2 Practical lessons
Our generalization of Newcomb’s paradox arguably made it more realistic. How-
ever, there still seems to be a gap between our analysis and practical Newcomb-
like problems.
4.2.1 Newcomb-like pragmatic problems
At its heart, Newcomb’s paradox is about the possibility for an external ob-
server to better predict what we will decide than what we can predict ourselves.
Crucially, we showed that such an external observer does not need to be some
supernatural omniscient entity. Any observer with vastly more data than us
could potentially predict our future decisions better than we can — and use
this to trick us.
Arguably, billions of dollars are currently being invested to create such al-
gorithmic observers. By leveraging the huge amounts of data provided by their
users, social media algorithms are constantly trying to predict how likely we are
to click on the contents that they decide to recommend to us. Meanwhile, the
way we use these social medias, often without paying our utmost attention to
our decision systems, means that we may make decisions without even realizing
it. In such a case, it seems reasonable to argue that algorithms actually already
know many of our future decisions better than we do ourselves.
It may be interesting for future work to investigate how Newcomb’s paradox
can inform us on what we ought to do in such contexts; or at least, on what
decisions would be least counterfactually wrong.
4.2.2 Remarks for non-Bayesians
We assumed that Emma and Omega are pure Bayesians. This hypothesis
turned out to be extremely useful to gain insights into Newcomb’s paradox.
However, it is noteworthy that, in general, Bayesianism requires unreasonable
computing resources, and thus cannot be applied exactly in practice, as ex-
plained by Solomonoff [2009]. This leaves us with the question of the robustness
of our results, if we now consider non-Bayesian entities.
Note that the assumption that Omega is (believed to be) Bayesian is not
critical. The critical feature of our analysis is rather that Omega is expected
to have more data than Emma, which allows Omega to better predict what
Dan will decide. In fact, it suffices that Omega’s prediction ω remains strongly
correlated with Dan’s decision, even given Emma’s data.
The case of Emma is slightly more problematic, as Emma needs to ap-
ply the law of probabilities to compute counterfactuals. However, again, by
assuming that she can reasonably well approximate the computation of the
counterfactuals, then it is sensible to consider that she is engaging in approxi-
mate Bayesian counterfactual reasoning. The general take-aways of our analysis
would then apply.
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4.2.3 Logical non-omnniscience
Even if epistemic systems know exactly their decision algorithms and the inputs
of these algorithms, they may be incapable to derive the decision unless they
perform themselves the computations of the decision algorithms. This postu-
late was called computational irreducibility by Wolfram [2002]. A consequence
of this postulate is that computational limits actually add another source of
uncertainty, which cannot be taken into account by the Bayesian framework
alone, as explained by Hoang [2020].
More generally, as argued by Aaronson [2012], computational complexity
theory may be critical to understand diverse philosophical paradoxes. Its im-
plications to Newcomb’s paradox have yet to be analyzed.
4.3 Deconstructing entities
The core idea of our analysis was a clear separation between an entity’s epis-
temic system and their decision system. In particular, we exploited the fact that
the epistemic system should have some epistemic uncertainty about their deci-
sion system, which we argued to be critical to understand Newcomb’s paradox.
However, the decomposition of any entity into different systems with different
tasks can be taken further, as argued by Hoang [2019].
4.3.1 Data collection system
Interestingly, our analysis highlights the importance of data in Newcomb’s para-
dox. Indeed, we saw that Emma will consider that 1-box is counterfactually
preferable if and only if she expects Omega to have access to sufficiently more
data DΩ so that Omega’s uncertainty about Dan’s decision is greatly reduced.
Note that, however, we did not discuss how Omega would access such data.
More generally, data is arguably critical for any entity, both for the epistemic
and the decision systems. Therefore, it seems critical for the entity, or for any
analysis of the entity, to carefully design or understand their data collection
system. Arguably, in the case of the COVID-19 crisis, in at least some parts
of the world, this system was defective, typically because of a lack of tests or
because of data misreporting. In practice, improving data collection systems is
a key aspect of improving an entity.
In particular, especially for large-scale critical applications, designing a qual-
ity data collection systems seems to require features such as data authentication,
data storage and data communication. Results in the fields of cryptography, dif-
ferential privacy or distributed computing may add insights into Newcomb-like
problems.
4.3.2 Reward systems
In this paper, we assumed that the rewards were given by Omega. In fact,
Omega was essentially Emma’s reward system.
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In practice, most entities’ rewards are much more complex to compute. Hu-
mans may care about happiness, glory or flourishing, or a certain combination of
all three. Organizations may want to advance their cause, publish papers, pro-
tect their nations, save lives or make their business sustainable. Finally, many
algorithms have been designed to maximize profits, clicks or user attention.
In most cases, rewards are arguably what determine these entities’ decisions
the most, and thus their impacts on the world. In particular, a watch-time max-
imizing algorithm may flood the Internet with clickbait, virulent and unreliable
videos, which may then encourage climate denialism Allgaier [2019], promote
dangerous health recommandations Johnson et al. [2020] or normalize radical-
izations Ribeiro et al. [2020], while a profit-maximizing company may disregard
its externalities, and a drug addict may neglect the long-term effects of their
drug consumption. Note that, in these examples, the rewards to be maximized
are not harmful in themselves; but they are oblivious of major negative side
effects. Carefully understanding and designing entities’ reward systems seems
critical.
One important feature of reward systems is that they too need to rely on a
data collection system and an epistemic system. To illustrate, the rewards to
be given to a public health organization should arguably depend on the actual
health of the population. However, if this population does not get tested, or
if the mental health of the population is not properly inferred from the data,
then the public health organization’s rewards may be misleading. This defect
of the computation of the rewards may then create flawed motivations for the
entity, which can lead to poor decisions by the decision system, and to poor
assessments by the epistemic system.
More generally, as argued by Hoang [2019], the careful understanding and
design of entities’ reward systems is arguably the most critical feature to under-
stand these entities, and to make them more robustly beneficial for the future
of our planet. Perhaps Newcomb-like paradoxes can shed more light into what
can and cannot be achieved from the interaction between the reward system
and the other systems of an entity.
4.3.3 Maintenance system
One last component discussed in Hoang [2019] is themaintenance system. Given
that any entity almost surely has imperfect data collection, reward, epistemic
and decision systems, it seems critical that the entity is aware of this, and
actively aims to combat the defects of these components.
One example of defect within humans, and arguably within organizations
too, is the confirmation bias. A decision made by our decision systems can
sometimes harm the capabilities of our epistemic systems, by irrationally favor-
ing justifications of our decisions, even when they are poor (see the survey by
Nickerson [1998]).
Another example of defect is known as the law of Goodhart [1975], which
says that “when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure”.
Recently, El-Mhamdi and Hoang [2020] even showed that a fat-tail discrepancy
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between a deployed imperfect reward system and its ideal version could make
reward maximization infinitely bad, according to the ideal reward system.
It thus seems critical for any robustly beneficial entity evolving in complex
environments with feedback loops to have a maintenance system that keeps
track of the imperfections of their epistemic, decision, data collection and reward
system, and that actively tries to fix and improve these systems if needed.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposed to more clearly distinguish an entity’s epistemic system
from its decision system. I argued that this allowed to better understand
Newcomb-like problems. In particular, based on this insight, I proved the im-
possibility of counterfactual optimization. Moreover, I showed that Newcomb’s
problem can be reformulated in terms of the capability of some observer to bet-
ter predict the decision of an entity than the epistemic system of the entity can.
Finally, I discussed numerous further research challenges to better understand
information processing entities, and to better design entities that make robustly
beneficial decisions.
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